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LAW, VIOLENCE, AND THE NEUROTIC STRUCTURE
OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW
Sarah Krakoff*
INTRODUCTION
In American Indian law, judges (and the bureaucratic
machinery of which they are a part) have inflicted a largely one-
sided story on native peoples. Legal interpretations that
dispossessed this country's indigenous peoples of vast swaths of
their territory,' folded them, without their consent, into the
domestic legal order 2 and yet recurrently (if discontinuously)
afforded them a measure of independence and freedom to govern
themselves. 3 This has beyond a doubt taken place in fields "of pain
and death."4 Robert Cover's important rebuke to Ronald Dworkin,
James Boyd White, and others that legal interpretation does not
exist separate from its power to eliminate and destroy resonates
deeply throughout the laws that govern U.S. relations with
American Indian tribes. 5  Cover's essential point-that legal
interpretation, unlike its purely literary cousins, must be in bed
with force and violence 6-maps well onto every aspect of this
fraught body of legal doctrine.
Cover focused on the enmeshed nature, or as he put it:
"bondedness" of legal interpretation. 7 Interpretation is not legal,
according to Cover, unless it is situated within a web of social and
* Professor and Schaden Chair of Experiential Learning, University of
Colorado Law School.
1. See Tee-Hit-Ton Indians v. United States, 348 U.S. 272, 284-85 (1955)
(holding that the Fifth Amendment prohibition on taking land without just
compensation did not apply to aboriginal lands not recognized by treaty);
Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 573-74 (1823) ("discovery" of continent by
Europeans resulted in limitations to aboriginal title).
2. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831) (holding that
Indian tribes are "domestic dependent nations" rather than foreign nations for
the purpose of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction).
3. See Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (holding that Indian
tribes have exclusive jurisdiction over claims against tribal members arising on
tribal lands); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, 557 (1832) (stating that tribes
have inherent power to govern their members and their territory).
4. Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601 (1986).
5. Id. at 1601-02 n.2.
6. Id. at 1606-07.
7. See id. at 1617.
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institutional machinery that can effectuate it.s The implication is
that words alone cannot enact the violence that law entails. But
sometimes the words of American Indian law themselves have
constituted the violence. Legal interpretation has not just taken
place in a field of pain and death; it has at times constructed the
field. Cover drew short of concluding that violence is embedded in
legal language, but others have not been shy to do so.9 Christopher
Tomlinson has argued that the texts and technologies of North
American colonization "fueled and realized the colonizer's violent
ideology of differentiation and exclusion from the outset."10 Robert
Williams Jr. has made similar observations about American Indian
law's historical origins, as well as what he concludes to be its
inevitably poisoned status today." Historically, the words of
American Indian law alone cleaved tribal property, 12 diminished
tribal sovereignty,1 3 and erased U.S. acts of unilateral violence,
coercion, and corruption. 14 (To say that words caused independent
violence is not to say that other kinds of violence were not involved;
but words often pulled their own weight, while other state and
privately sponsored projects engaged in complementary acts of
violence.) Today, tribes are boxed in by the terms set by this
colonizing framework. They are forced to make arguments that
8. Id.
9. See id. at 1613 (emphasizing legal interpretation's tie to action).
Scholars who have argued otherwise include Pierre Bourdieux and Carol
Greenhouse. Richard Terdiman, Introduction to Pierre Bourdieu, The Force of
Law: Toward a Sociology of the Juridical Field, 38 HASTINGS L.J. 805, 809
(1987) ('The texts of the law are thus quintessentially texts which produce their
own effects. Bourdieu devotes particular attention to this special linguistic and
social power of the law 'to do things with words."'); see also Carol J. Greenhouse,
Reading Violence, in LAW'S VIOLENCE 105, 111 (Austin Sarat & Thomas R.
Kearns eds., 1995).
10. Christopher Tomlins, In a Wilderness of Tigers: Violence, the Discourse
of English Colonizing, and the Refusals of American History, 4 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 451, 454 (2003).
11. See ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., LIKE A LOADED WEAPON: THE REHNQUIST
COURT, INDIAN RIGHTS, AND THE LEGAL HISTORY OF RACISM IN AMERICA 161-63
(2005); ROBERT A. WILLIAMS, JR., THE AMERICAN INDIAN IN WESTERN LEGAL
THOUGHT: THE DISCOURSES OF CONQUEST 325-27 (1990).
12. See Johnson v. M'Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 586 (1823).
13. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978)
(holding that Indian tribes have no criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians);
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1, 17 (1831).
14. See Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 568 (1903) (concluding that
there is no judicial review of treaty violations, based in part on the
government's entitlement to a presumption of good faith, notwithstanding a
factual record to the contrary). This aspect of Lone Wolf has since been
repudiated. See Del. Tribal Bus. Comm. v. Weeks, 430 U.S. 73, 84 (1977)
(stating that the Court has not been deterred from "scrutinizing Indian
legislation to determine whether it violates the equal protection component of
the Fifth Amendment").
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support their self-governing status in the language that aimed at
their elimination.
15
All of this is true. American Indian legal interpretation has
created and taken place in a field of pain and death. And yet today
there are 566 federally recognized tribes as well as a number of non-
recognized and state-recognized tribes, 16 all of which perpetuate
distinctly indigenous forms of law and culture. 17 In addition, there
are swaths of the country that, for lack of a more precise term, still
feel like Indian country. If you are not an American Indian, you will
feel like an outsider, a stranger, or a tourist when you visit. You
will feel, in other words, awkward and uncomfortable, like you are
in a place that is not yours, because it isn't. Law's violence
continues to operate as a structure in Indian country, but native
agency and resilience, as well as ambivalence within the law itself
(both inherently and in terms of fluctuating policy periods), have
created spaces beyond the totalizing violence of the law. As
postcolonial theorists have posited, these spaces do not erase the
structures of violence, which continue to deform and construct the
operative domain for indigenous expression and action.18 But at the
same time, the violence of legalized settler-colonialism has not
succeeded in snuffing out or making impossible independent
indigenous communities of meaning.19
What I want to explore in this Essay is whether there is
something about the persistence of American Indian communities
and their ability to make their own laws and meanings-their
ability to be "jurisgenerative" in the way that only local communities
can, according to Cover2 0-that nags at the federal judiciary, that
taunts them to try repeatedly to cabin this ungovernable "other."
After more than two and a half centuries of legal (and legalized)
15. See WILLIAMS, LIKE A LOADED WEAPON, supra note 11, at 326-28; see
also Robert B. Porter, The Meaning of Indigenous Nation Sovereignty, 34 ARIZ.
ST. L.J. 75, 94 (2002).
16. Frequently Asked Questions, BuREAU OF INDIAN AFF., http:/bia.gov
/FAQs/index.htm (last visited June 15, 2014).
17. Id.
18. See generally Sally Engle Merry, Law and Colonialism, 25 LAW & SOCY
REV. 889 (1991) (reviewing several books examining the law's role in colonial
and postcolonial societies).
19. See id. at 917 ("Law often serves as the handmaiden for processes of
domination, helping to create new systems of control and regulation. At the
same time, it constrains these systems and provides arenas for resistance.").
American Indian tribes have also used international forums and international
human rights law to further the development of their own local laws and, to
some degree, to subvert the jurispathic course of U.S. American Indian law. See
Kristen A. Carpenter & Angela R. Riley, Indigenous Peoples and the
Jurisgenerative Moment in Human Rights, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 173, 208-11
(2014).
20. See Cover, supra note 4, at 1602 n.2; see also Robert Cover, Nomos and
Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 18 (1983).
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violence, American Indian tribes still persist, and they do so in a
way that protects an ineffable and unconquerable indigeneity. 21 I
wonder whether the disproportionate number of federal judicial
decisions (and in particular Supreme Court decisions) devoted to
defining, diminishing, cabining, and parsing tribes and their rights
and powers is as much a reflection of law's impotence (the limits of
its violence) to erase tribes as it is of its power to destroy. Does
judicial anxiety about these limits drive the Court to try, over and
over, to extend its interpretive stance into communities decidedly
unlikely to act in concert with the Court's commands? This Essay
will probe that question.
I. AN EXCESS OF AMERICAN INDIAN LAW?
Since 1959, when the Supreme Court decided Williams v. Lee, 22
which many consider to be the beginning of the "modern era" in
American Indian law, 23 the Court has decided more than 150 cases
involving the rights of American tribes or tribal members.24 In the
early years of the modern era, the cases were a mixed bag for tribes.
Several landmark cases revived long-standing doctrines supporting
tribes' inherent authority to govern their territory and their
members, despite several decades of mixed outcomes in the lower
courts.25 Other cases furthered contemporary policies of tribal self-
determination by allowing older statutes, whose aims of tribal
elimination had been repudiated, to fall into desuetude. 26 Some
decisions, on the other hand, limited tribal powers or allowed a
degree of state regulation to intrude into Indian country.27
21. For more on this notion, see generally Sarah Krakoff, A Narrative of
Sovereignty: Illuminating the Paradox of the Domestic Dependent Nation, 83 OR.
L. REV. 1109 (2004) (arguing that tribal sovereignty, for all of its batterings and
flaws, provides a protective shell around the evolution of distinctly tribal norms
and culture); see also Carpenter & Riley, supra note 19, at 222.
22. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
23. David H. Getches, Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New
Subjectivism of the Supreme Court in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1574
n.3 (1996).
24. Supreme Court, TURTLE TALK (Aug. 22, 2014),
http://turtletalk.wordpress.com/resources/supreme-court-indian-lawcases/.
25. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978); United States
v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975); Williams, 358 U.S. at 221-22.
26. See Bryan v. Itasca Cnty., 426 U.S. 373, 393 (1976); Menominee Tribe
of Indians v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 412-13 (1968).
27. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 545 (1981); Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 161-62
(1980); Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 198 n.8 (1978). For
scholarship assessing the cases during this period and coming to somewhat
different conclusions about the uniformity of the decisions, see Philip P.
Frickey, Congressional Intent, Practical Reasoning, and the Dynamic Nature of
Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 1137, 1231-40 (1990); David Getches,
Conquering the Cultural Frontier: The New Subjectivism of the Supreme Court
in Indian Law, 84 CALIF. L. REV. 1573, 1573-74 (1996).
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As the decades wore on, however, the record of wins and losses
shifted dramatically. Since the mid-1980s, American Indian tribes
or tribal members (or clients representing tribal interests) have had
a win/loss ratio of less than 1:4.28 In 2002, David Getches testified
before Congress that the tribes' record before the Supreme Court
was the worst of any subset of litigants:
I looked at possibilities ranging from immigration to criminal
cases, and the worst record I found for any litigants other than
Indians was convicted criminals seeking reversals of their
convictions. I found that convicted criminals won 34 percent of
the time while Indian tribes have won only 23 percent of the
time. Nobody does worse in this Supreme Court than Indian
tribes. 2
9
The situation has not improved under the Roberts Court, and
advocates for tribes and tribal interests have adopted a simple, if
not foolproof, strategy: if at all possible, keep cases out of the
Supreme Court.30 This is not easy to do, however, because non-
Indian litigants seek review of cases that they lose in the lower
courts,3 1 and the Supreme Court seems to have a significant
appetite for cases involving Indian law issues.3 2 Almost as striking
as tribes' win/loss ratio is the disproportionate number of Indian law
cases that the Court takes. In the last eleven years, the Court has
decided twelve such cases.33 When one considers that American
28. See David H. Getches, Beyond Indian Law: The Rehnquist Court's
Pursuit of States' Rights, Color-Blind Justice and Mainstream Values, 86 MINN.
L. REV. 267, 280 (2001).
29. Rulings of the U.S. Supreme Court as They Affect the Powers and
Authorities of the Indian Tribal Governments: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Indian Affairs, 107th Cong. 6 (2002) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of David
Getches, Professor, University of Colorado at Boulder, School of Law).
30. The Native American Rights Fund has organized a Supreme Court
working group, whose focus is to avoid the Court if possible, and if not, to
create, through an organized briefing and amicus strategy, multiple options for
the Court to issue narrow rulings that will do the least damage to Indian law
principles. Tribal Supreme Court Project, NATIVE AM. RTS. FUND,
http://sct.narf.org/index.html (last visited July 12, 2014).
31. Krakoff, supra note 21, at 1156.
32. Hearings, supra note 29, at 4-5.
33. See List of United States Supreme Court Cases Involving Indian Tribes,
WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List of UnitedStates_SupremeCourt
_casesinvolvingIndiantribes (last visited July 12, 2014) (listing Adoptive
Couple v. Baby Girl, 133 S. Ct. 2255 (2013); Salazar v. Ramah Navajo Chapter,
132 S. Ct. 2181 (2012); United States v. Navajo Nation, 556 U.S. 287 (2009);
Carcieri v. Salazar, 555 U.S. 379 (2009); Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family
Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S. 316 (2008); Wagnon v. Prairie Band Potawatomi
Indians, 546 U.S. 95 (2005); City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S.
197 (2005); United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004); S. Fla. Water Mgmt.
Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004); Inyo Cnty. v. Paiute-
Shoshone Indians of the Bishop Cmty. of the Bishop Colony, 538 U.S. 701
(2003); United States v. Navajo Nation, 437 U.S. 488 (2003); United States v.
2014]
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Indians make up less than two percent of the population, and tribes,
though numerous, represent small slices of the economy, 34 it is all
the more puzzling that these cases take up such a high proportion of
the Court's limited docket. One possible explanation is that
American Indian tribes and tribal members, though representing a
small fraction of the population and economy, are, by virtue of their
unique history and status in the United States, much more likely to
engage in activities that instigate or require federal litigation. That
is certainly true, but in addition to being a pretty boring story, it
does not account for the high number of Supreme Court cases, even
if it helps to explain the greater percentage of federal litigation.
With that brief brush-off, we will leave the realm of alternative
explanations and swerve into the one that relates to Cover's thesis
about law and violence. What if there is too much American Indian
law because a great deal of what it purports to affect remains
always beyond its reach?
II. TRIBAL COURT JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court has been particularly active in the area of
policing the subject matter jurisdiction of tribal courts. Tribes, as
governments with attributes of sovereignty that were never
extinguished by the United States, do not derive their power from
the U.S. Constitution and are not subject to the constraints in the
Bill of Rights. 35 Further, there is no mechanism, constitutional or
statutory, for either parallel or appellate jurisdiction over the
substance of tribal court decisions. 36 In this respect, tribal courts
White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003)); see also Matthew L. M.
Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier to Justice
for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIz. L. REV. 933, 944-45 (2009) (analyzing tribal success
in the Supreme Court through 2006).
34. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE: AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE
HERITAGE MONTH 1 (2012), available at http://www.census.gov/newsroom
/releases/archives/facts for features special-editions/cbl2-ff22.html.
35. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 55-59 (1978) (stating
that tribes are pre- and extra-constitutional governments and Congress must be
clear when abrogating aspects of tribal sovereignty); United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313, 329-30 (1978) (holding that tribes are separate sovereigns and
therefore the double jeopardy clause does not bar federal prosecution for the
same crime as previous tribal prosecution); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384
(1896) (tribes' sovereignty does not derive from the Constitution, and therefore
the Bill of Rights does not apply to tribal prosecution). Tribes are, however,
constrained by the Indian Civil Rights Act, a federal law passed in 1968 that
contains many of the provisions in the Bill of Rights. Indian Civil Rights Act
(ICRA), 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303 (2012). For more on the ICRA, its history, and
its applications, see THE INDIAN CIVIL RIGHTS ACT AT FORTY (Kristen A.
Carpenter et al. eds., 2012).
36. Eugene R. Fidell, An American Indian Supreme Court, 2 AM. INDIAN
L.J. 1, 3 (2013).
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are less subordinate to the federal judiciary than are state courts.
37
Nonetheless, as a result of a string of cases that began with the
seemingly innocuous conclusion that the question of a tribal court's
jurisdiction was itself a federal question, and therefore reviewable
by the federal courts,38 the Supreme Court has narrowed the types
of cases that can be brought in tribal courts and has subjected the
inquiry to wooden and inflexible categorical rules that are out of
step with similar jurisdictional standards in the non-Indian law
context. 3
9
A detailed review of the leading case will highlight the curious
nature of the Court's outsized attention to this area of law. In
Strate v. A-1 Contractors,40 Mrs. Gisela Fredericks, the non-Indian
wife of a deceased member of the Fort Berthold Tribe, was involved
in a car accident with a non-Indian who worked for a construction
company employed by the Tribe. 41  Mrs. Fredericks sued the
construction company in tribal court.42 For Mrs. Fredericks, the
Fort Berthold Reservation was home. 43 She had lived there since
she emigrated from Germany to the United States in order to marry
her husband, whom she met overseas when he was serving in World
War 11.44 Mrs. Fredericks and her husband had five children who
were tribal members, all of whom were raised on the Reservation.
45
Lyle Stockert, the non-Indian who collided with Mrs. Fredericks,
was driving on a dead-end road on the Reservation that terminated
at a reservoir.46 While the road was a state highway, it was not a
throughway, and virtually the only reason to be on it would be to
access tribal buildings or the homes of tribal members.
47 A-1
Contractors, the construction company, filed an action in federal
court to challenge the tribal court's subject matter jurisdiction.
48
37. While federal courts lack subject matter jurisdiction over many state
law matters, state decisions on federal issues are subject to review by the
United States Supreme Court. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2012).
Moreover, federal diversity jurisdiction allows federal courts to hear many state
law matters. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; 28 U.S.C § 1332 (2012).
38. See Nat'l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 857
(1985); see also Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987).
39. For a review and analysis of recent tribal civil jurisdiction cases, see
generally Sarah Krakoff, Tribal Civil Judicial Jurisdiction over Nonmembers: A
Practical Guide for Judges, 81 U. COLO. L. REV. 1187 (2010).
40. 520 U.S. 438 (1997).
41. Id. at 438.
42. Id.
43. Hearings, supra note 29, at 8-9.
44. Id.
45. Id.; see also Brief for Petitioners at 28, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872), 191996 WL 656356, at *18.
46. Transcript of Oral Argument at 10-11, Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520
U.S. 438 (1997) (No. 95-1872).
47. See id.
48. Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
2014]
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The Eighth Circuit held that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over
the case, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari and affirmed.49
The Court, in a unanimous decision authored by Justice
Ginsburg, held that a tribe's judicial jurisdiction over nonmembers
for claims arising on non-tribal lands within the tribe's reservation
(in this case, a ribbon of state highway surrounded by tribal land)
was limited to two narrow circumstances: when the nonmember
enters into a consensual relationship with the tribe or a tribal
member that gives rise to the claim, or when the nonmember's
actions have "direct effect[s]" on the political integrity, economic
security, or health or welfare of the tribe. 50
Strate was a pivotal case in American Indian law. The Supreme
Court had already decided, as a matter of its own common law of
tribal sovereignty, that tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction over
nonmembers. 51 But the cases addressing the reach of a tribe's civil
jurisdiction pointed in two directions, one tending toward a
presumption in favor of tribal jurisdiction and the other against it.52
Strate, in many respects, had "good" facts to present the question:
the case was local in nature, Mrs. Fredericks and her tribal member
children (who were also parties to the case initially) lived on the
Reservation, the accident occurred within the Reservation's
boundaries, and the defendants were present on the Reservation to
do work for the Tribe.53 Had the Court approached the question in a
manner similar to the due process inquiry applied in personal
jurisdiction cases in state or federal courts, the non-Indian
defendants would unquestionably have been subject to suit in the
tribal court.54 Instead of viewing the case through that lens,
however, the Court stated that tribes presumptively lack
jurisdiction over nonmembers, and that the facts must fit into one of
the two exceptions mentioned above to overcome that presumption.55
Since Strate, the Court has decided two other tribal court civil
jurisdiction cases, neither of which changed the Court's basic
49. Id. at 444-45.
50. Id. at 456-57 (citing Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565-66
(1981)).
51. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978).
52. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 15 (1987) (in favor);
Nat'l Farmers Ins. Co. v. Crow Tribe, 471 U.S. 845, 857 (1985) (in favor);
Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959) (in favor). But see Montana, 450 U.S.
at 545 (against).
53. Strate, 520 U.S. at 438.
54. See Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 471-73 (1985);
World Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 299 (1980); Hanson v.
Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 249-52 (1958) (discussing due process approach to
personal jurisdiction in federal and state courts).
55. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 456.
[Vol. 49
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approach, but both of which held that the tribal court lacked
jurisdiction in discrete circumstances.
56
There is little question that the Court's civil jurisdiction cases
have had significant impacts on some tribes.57 Some non-Indian
litigants flee to federal court shortly after they are sued in tribal
court, whether or not there are sound bases for the tribal court to
keep the case.58  The procedural wrangling causes delay and
uncertainty for the tribal judicial system as well as the parties. In
addition, non-Indians who want to do business in Indian country are
more likely to resist forum selection or consent-to-jurisdiction
clauses when entering into lease agreements with tribal parties,
even for arrangements that arise on and involve tribal resources or
property. 59 Less concretely, but with more profound implications for
tribal self-governance, tribes cannot uniformly impose their
standards for due care, health, and safety throughout their territory
(the norms of tort law) due to the Court's piecemeal land status
approach to jurisdictional rules for Indian country.
60
Despite these serious effects, there is a paradoxical sense in
which the Court matters very little to tribes. Every day in Indian
country, non-Indians do business with tribes and tribal members
and enter into relationships, commercial and otherwise, that link
their fates; tribes therefore regularly subject non-Indians to the
influence of tribal norms and laws.61 In Indian country (as in the
rest of the country), very few interactions and arrangements, legal
or not, make their way to the courts.62 To the extent that tribes
56. See Plains Commerce Bank v. Long Family Land & Cattle Co., 554 U.S.
316, 320 (2008); Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 367-68 (2001).
57. See Krakoff, supra note 21, at 1148-49.
58. See id. at 1159.
59. See id. at 1161.
60. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 454 & n.9 (concluding that a ribbon of state
highway running through a reservation is not "Indian country"); Nord v. Kelly,
520 F.3d 848, 857 (8th Cir. 2008) (holding that there was no tribal court
jurisdiction over an action arising on state right-of-way running through a
reservation); Boxx v. Long Warrior, 265 F.3d 771, 774-78 (9th Cir. 2001)
(holding that there was no tribal court jurisdiction over action arising on non-
tribal road running through a reservation); see also Krakoff, supra note 39, at
1236-43 (providing a table of federal tribal civil jurisdiction cases from 1997-
2009).
61. See, e.g., Gabriel S. Galanda, Getting Commercial in Indian Country,
Bus. L. TODAY, (July-Aug. 2003), http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba
/publicationslblt/2003/07/full-issue-200307.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited June
21, 2014) ("Both the cause and effect of the dramatic rise in Indian economic
development is the increased interaction of tribes and nontribal parties who
seek business, employment, or recreation on Indian reservations.").
62. For example, in 2000, 180,462 Navajo members lived on tribal lands.
ARIz. RuRAL POLICYY INST. ET AL, DEMOGRAPHIC ANALYSIS OF THE NAvAJO NATION
8 (2010), available at http://azcia.gov/DocumentsfLinks/DemoProfiles/Navajo
%20Nation.pdf. However, Navajo courts heard only 46,876 civil cases in the
20141
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enact their sovereignty on the ground (through cultural, economic,
educational, and other institutions), they impose their norms and
laws on non-Indians regardless of the jurisdictional battles that
occur at the margins. 63 The Court has no power to reach into Indian
country and disrupt the spread of tribal law that occurs in this way.
Tribes, therefore, continue to be jurisgenerative, notwithstanding
the Court's interpretive violence.
Leading scholars have articulated several sound explanations
for the Court's recurring attempts to curb tribes' jurisdiction, 64 but
Cover's thesis about law's violence provides one more. For
interpretation to become legal, according to Cover, the law's words
must be integrated with "role" and "deed."65 Judges require the
concerted actions of other legal actors to forge, agree with, enforce,
and carry out their interpretations. 66 In American Indian law, those
networks may stop at Indian country's borders. Some tribes have
openly questioned whether the Court's doctrine applies to them
when it strays from their own tribal law interpretations. 67 More
subtly, to many people who live, work, and create meaning in Indian
country, the Court's words may warrant nothing more than a shrug.
They said what? What difference does that make to us? The limits
of law's violence may explain, at least in part, the judiciary's
recurring attempts to impose it.
III. TRIBAL MEMBERSHIP
The Court has also exhibited anxiety about tribes'
extraconstitutional status in the context of tribal membership. Last
year, the Court decided Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl,68 a case
involving the custody of a young child who spent the first two years
of her life with white adoptive parents and the next two years with
her biological father, an enrolled member of the Cherokee Nation of
Oklahoma. 69 The fate of "Baby Veronica," as she became known in
year 2001, including cases concerning non-Navajo parties. BUREAU OF JUSTICE
STATISTICS, CENSUS OF TRIBAL JUSTICE AGENCIES IN INDIAN COUNTRY 57 (2002).
63. See Carpenter & Riley, supra note 19, at 219-20 (discussing the tribal
courts' application of tribal common law to create norms that reflect the tribe's
values and customs and respond to the tribe's needs).
64. See Philip P. Frickey, A Common Law for Our Age of Colonialism, 109
YALE L.J. 1, 57-81 (1999) (canvassing the possible explanations for the Court's
anti-Indian jurisprudence); Getches, supra note 28, at 268 (theorizing that the
Court uses Indian law cases to further other agendas, including states' rights
and a color-blind approach to discrimination).
65. See Cover, supra note 4, at 1611-12.
66. See id.
67. See Robert Odawi Porter, The Inapplicability of American Law to the
Indian Nations, 89 IOWA L. REv. 1595, 1618 & nn.104-07 (2004) (citing and
discussing tribal court cases).
68. 133 S. Ct. 2552 (2013).
69. Id. at 2558-59.
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the press, 70 captivated national attention. The case proved to be a
good vehicle to challenge aspects of the Indian Child Welfare Act
("ICWA"),71 a federal law that imposes distinct procedural and
substantive requirements on the adoption and foster care placement
of American Indian children, because the ICWA's application to
Baby Veronica resulted in the tearful scene of her being taken away
from her adoptive parents at the age of two by a father whcm she
had never met. 72 In an opinion that was clearly swayed by the
adoptive parents' narrative of the story, the Court held that the
ICWA did not apply to Baby Veronica's adoption. 73 This set in
motion the second wrenching change of custody in the girl's short
life, which was carried out with dispatch when the adoptive parents
took her, at the age of four, from her Cherokee father back to a home
that she likely barely recalled.
74
Adoptive Couple seems like an object lesson in legal
interpretation as violence. Twice, families were ripped apart as a
result of judicial utterances. The second time, it was permanent.
The Court's interpretation of a handful of words in the ICWA tore
Baby Veronica from her Cherokee father, and every legal actor
appealed to since has upheld that decision.75 Moreover, the Court's
opinion reflected more than just its rather strained approach to
statutory interpretation. 76 Throughout the majority opinion, Justice
Alito made reference to Baby Veronica's percentage of Cherokee
blood.77 At the outset of the decision, for example, the Court
described her as "classified as an Indian because she is 1.2% (3/256)
Cherokee." 78 Baby Veronica was "classified" as Indian not because
of the percentage of her Cherokee blood, but because she was
eligible for membership in the Cherokee Nation according to its
citizenship rules, which are based on lineal descent from historic
70. Lyle Denniston, "Baby Veronica" Case Back at the Court, SCOTUSBLOG
(July 26, 2013, 4:11 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2013/O7[baby-veronica-case
-back-at-the-court/
71. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1901-1963 (2012).
72. Capobianco Adoption: Baby Veronica Case Brings Sadness, Joy,
EPOCHTIMES (Aug. 8, 2013, 7:01 PM), http://www.theepochtimes.com
/n3/236798-capobianco-adoption-baby-veronica-case-brings-sadness-joy/.
73. Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2555.
74. Eyder Peralta, Okla. Court Says 'Baby Veronica' Should Go to Adoptive
Parents, NPR (Sept. 23, 2013, 9:01 PM), http://www.npr.orgblogs/thetwo-way
/2013/09/23/225540776/okla-court-says-baby-veronica-should-go-to-adoptive-
parents.
75. See Adoptive Couple v. Baby Girl, 746 S.E.2d 51, 54 (2013) (directing
entry of order finalizing adoption after remand from the U.S. Supreme Court).
76. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2572 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting)
(criticizing and dissecting the majority's approach to interpreting the statute's
terms).
77. Id. at 2556, 2559, 2565.
78. Id. at 2556 (emphasis added).
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rolls.7 9  The Court's mention of her percentage or fraction of
Cherokee blood was irrelevant. (To sharpen the point, there are
people with much greater degrees of Cherokee blood who are not
eligible for membership because they cannot trace their ancestry to
the historic rolls;8 0 in short, no one is eligible for Cherokee
membership because of blood quantum.) The Court's unsubtle
implication, however, was that Baby Veronica was not really Indian
enough to warrant the ICWA's coverage. The Court did not decide
the case on that basis but instead interpreted the ICWA not to apply
to biological fathers who never had physical custody of their
children.8 1 Nonetheless, toward the end of the opinion, Justice Alito
mentioned that the Court's decision allowed it to avoid "equal
protection concerns" raised by the adoptive parents.8 2  Those
concerns, presumably, were that classifying Veronica as Cherokee
would have impermissibly checked her off by race for the purpose of
determining her adoptive status and therefore violated the Equal
Protection Clause. As I have discussed elsewhere, the Court would
have had to second-guess the Cherokee Nation's membership
criteria, which it had no power to do, and overturn settled precedent
in order to decide that the ICWA violates the Equal Protection
Clause on these facts.8 3 It is not surprising that the Court chose not
to go there. At the same time, it is a discomforting sign for
advocates of tribal self-determination that the Court employed tired
and racialized stereotypes of Indians (that the only real Indians are
"full-bloods") as a shadow principle of statutory interpretation.
As in the tribal court jurisdiction cases, Adoptive Couple has
serious ramifications. First and foremost, Baby Veronica's Cherokee
family and the Cherokee Nation are forever affected for the worse.
8 4
Second, lawyers for non-Indian adoptive parents, guardians ad
litem, and some state courts will take this as a cue to ignore the
ICWA whenever possible.8 5 Third, American Indian birth fathers
79. Citizenship, CHEROKEE NATION, http://www.cherokee.org/Services
/TribalCitizenship/Citizenship.aspx (last visited June 18, 2014).
80. Brief for the Cherokee Nation at 38, Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. 2552
(No. 12-399).
81. See Adoptive Couple, 133 S. Ct. at 2562.
82. Id. at 2565.
83. See Sarah Krakoff, Constitutional Concern, Membership, and Race, FLA.
INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2014).
84. See Brian Daffron, Q&A with Cherokee Counsel for Baby Veronica Case:
The Supreme Court Decision Will Impact Every Tribe in the Country, INDIAN
COUNTRY (Apr. 11, 2013),
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/2013/04/11/qa-cherokee-counsel-
baby-veronica-case-supreme-court-decision-will-impact-every-tribe.
85. See Matthew L. M. Fletcher & Kathryn E. Fort, Indian Children and
Their Guardians Ad Litem, 93 B.U. L. REV. ANNEX 59, 59 (2013) (analyzing data
of Guardian Ad Litem ("GAL") actions in ICWA cases and concluding that
"many GALs throughout the nation subvert the national policy embodied by the
ICWA by advocating against the implementation of the statute in case after
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who are unable to obtain physical custody of their children before
adoption will be deprived of the protections of the ICWA.86
Nonetheless, there are also ways to see the Court's opinion as a
reflection of its limited powers in Indian country. The Court has no
power over tribal membership rules.87 Tribes' power to set their
own citizenship criteria is one of a small number of areas wholly
outside of federal judicial review, other than for a small number of
procedural issues.88 Many tribes consider the source of this power to
be located in the history and structure of their relationship with the
U.S. government and reinforced by the growing body of
international law on the rights of indigenous peoples.8 9 Similar to
the tribal civil jurisdiction context, tribes do not necessarily feel
constrained or defined by U.S. domestic law on the subject. 90 In
addition, despite centuries of attempts to eliminate Indian tribes as
separate political sovereigns and absorb their members into the
general population, tribes have survived and their members have
been steadily increasing.91 Tribal people and their fidelity to an
ever-evolving indigenous identity are the strongest rebuke to the
Court's legal violence in Adoptive Couple, even if they cannot
reverse the precise effects of the case. The Court's "equal protection
concerns" in Adoptive Couple reflect its ahistorical approach to
questions of race and equality generally-a trend that resonates
with historic policies aimed at eliminating tribes as separate
peoples. 92 But in the end the Court will always be a bystander to
tribal strategies for survival, for reasons grounded in the Court's
institutional limits as well as in the unstoppable agency of tribes
themselves.
CONCLUSION
Robert Cover's conclusions about law's violence were
ambivalent. On the one hand, interpretations were not legal unless
case"), available at http://www.bu.edu/bulawreview/files/2013/11/FLETCHER-
AND-FORT.pdf.
86. See In re J.S., 321 P.3d 103, 112 (Mont. 2014) (stating that the ICWA
does not apply to the termination of parental rights and foster care placement
where an Indian father never obtained physical custody); see also In re Elise W.,
No. 3718-DEP, 2014 WL 98674, at *9 (questioning whether the ICWA applies to
a case where an Indian father never had physical custody).
87. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 564 (1981).
88. See Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 71-72 (1978)
(explaining that the very small number of exceptions involve federal
administrative review of tribal constitutional amendments, if the tribal
constitution provides for such review).
89. See Carpenter & Riley, supra note 19, at 173.
90. See id. at 207.
91. See, e.g., Sarah Krakoff, Inextricably Political: Race, Membership, and
Tribal Sovereignty, 87 WASH. L. REV. 1041, 1103 (2012).
92. See id. at 1131.
2014] 755
WAKE FOREST LAWREVIEW
they were drawn in blood, sometimes figuratively but often
literally.93 On the other, Cover seemed to believe that law, or at
least judicial actors within the legal system, could use their power to
withhold law's violence. 94 Those acts, Cover implied, were no less
legal for tempering its violence. 95 American Indian law raises the
possibility of another limit to law's violence. Legal interpretations,
and their power to destroy and kill, are limited by their reach. This
is always true, of course. But in Indian country, the limits are not
just a function of the law's jurisdictional boundaries. Even where
domestic law purports to affect Indian country by its own terms,
tribes and their members remain beyond its reach for reasons
grounded in history, identity, and resistance. Tribes are extra-
constitutional not just because a handful of federal court cases
acknowledge that they are. Tribal people believe and act in a way
that perpetuates that status, and this is true in ways that are not
susceptible to analytic argument or empirical proof. It is, in some
sense, a matter of faith. But millions of people and hundreds of
tribes, federally acknowledged and otherwise, are a testament to its
stubborn, irreducible reality. Tribes have and will continue to
persist outside of the influence of American Indian law, and that
may well mean we will always have a great deal of law to interpret.
American Indian law's neurotic structure is not necessarily benign.
Its potential, and often its effects, are violent. But tribes fight back
through multiple mechanisms, one of which is the power to move
always just beyond American Indian law itself.
93. Cover, supra note 4, at 1607.
94. See id. at 1620-22 & n.48.
95. See id. Indeed, Cover is somewhat internally contradictory on this
point. See Tomlins, supra note 10, at 460-62.
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